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The Lemon-Squeezing Problem: 
Analytical and Computational Limitations in Collateralised Debt Obligation Evaluation 
 
Iain Hardie  
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Donald MacKenzie 
University of Edinburgh 
 
This article analyzes Collateralised Debt Obligations (‘CDOs’), complex securities that were 
at the heart of the recent financial crisis. The difficulties of analyzing these securities are 
considered, and it is argued that the increasing complexity of CDOs that repackaged 
Mortgage-Backed Securities outpaced the returns available to investors, and therefore the 
resources available to pay for the analysis required to value the securities adequately within 
the timeframe available. CDOs therefore faced the problem of computational intractability. 
Such an outcome was, the article argues, inevitable in financial innovation that sought to 
create ever-higher returns from the fixed returns on a pool of assets. CDOs created what the 
article labels a Lemon-Squeezing Problem. Implications for regulatory responses to the crisis 
are briefly explored. 
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‘If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it’. Peter Drucker 
 
Introduction 
 
At the heart of the financial crisis, it is widely argued, lay Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs), especially those whose underlying assets were Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs). 
Understanding these complicated financial instruments is central to understanding first why 
difficulties in the relatively small financial market of sub-prime mortgages became a systemic 
global financial crisis, and second to consider appropriate regulatory responses. This article 
also examines CDOs in detail, but focuses on the problems of valuing these securities, to 
reach novel conclusions as to the underlying problem with the financial innovation that 
produced these ‘toxic assets’. We show that the nature of CDOs meant that it was impossible 
for the returns they offered to be sufficient to meet the costs of analyzing them satisfactorily. 
The successive ‘slicing and dicing’ of a finite cash flow from a pool of assets inevitably 
increases complexity and equally inevitably outruns the analytical computational capacity to 
complete timely evaluation that investors buying low return securities could justify paying. 
Asymmetric information has been seen as lying at the heart of the problem with CDO 
evaluation. In the terminology of the classic article by Akerlof (1970), there is a lemons 
problem. The CDO market, in the same way as the second-hand car market Akerlof 
discusses, is undermined by the fact that sellers possess superior information about the 
product for sale than buyers  (‘lemons’ is American slang for a second-hand car that turns out 
to be very unsatisfactory). We show that the CDO market also involves what the article calls 
a ‘lemon-squeezing problem’: the inherent conflict between fixed returns (a finite quantity of 
‘lemon juice’) and the growing complexity of CDOs, a complexity that outpaced the 
resources needed to understand it. 
 
This article draws on 104 interviews with participants in the credit derivatives and asset-
backed securities markets in the US and UK (based mainly in London and New York). The 
90 interviewees (some of whom were interviewed more than once) were made up of 16 
current or former rating agency employees, 19 quantitative modellers, 37 arrangers, brokers 
or traders of MBS and/or CDOs, 6 regulators and 12 in various other roles in these markets. 
These were semi-structured interviews, which we recorded (except on the rare occasions 
interviewees refused permission) and had transcribed. Documentary sources are also 
analyzed, including the offering circulars (the information provided to prospective 
purchasers, sometimes also referred to as a prospectus) for a range of MBSs and CDOs, and 
interview recordings, taken from the website of the United States’ Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (FCIC). 
 
We contribute to two bodies of literature. The first is the literature on ‘market devices’, which 
is heavily influenced by the work of Callon (1998). The second body of literature (also 
burgeoning, but rather more disparate than the first) to which we contribute concerns the role 
of complexity in finance, for example in the genesis of the credit crisis (e.g., Arora, et al., 
2009; Bryan, et al., 2012; Engelen, et al., 2012).  
 
The structure of the article is as follows: in the next, second, section we discuss the two 
bodies of literature to which we make a contribution. Section three briefly introduces CDOs. 
Section four considers the analysis of CDOs, discussing the analytical software system Intex, 
which our interviews revealed was crucial to the MBS and CDO markets. Section five 
focuses on the low returns on highly rated CDO tranches, and section six on the need for 
timely analysis. In section seven, we consider the increasing complexity of the structural 
innovations in the CDO market, and how this has outpaced the increase in returns at each 
stage of market innovation. Section eight looks at the ways market participants try to deal 
with computational limitations. Section nine concludes. 
 
Market devices and computational complexity: The literature 
This section discusses the two areas of existing literature to which we contribute, and outlines 
that contribution. We discuss first the literature on market devices, and the lack of 
consideration for the cost of these devices. We than consider the literature on computational 
complexity and the limits of computing capacity. 
 
Recognising the Cost of Market Devices 
Examples of market devices range from the mundane (supermarket shelving and trollies) to 
the esoteric (pricing systems in financial-derivatives markets) and from technological objects 
(such as stock tickers) to mathematical concepts (such as those deployed in financial 
economics). Market devices are ‘the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the 
construction of markets’ (Muniesa, et al.,2007: 2). The work sparked by Callon and by the 
focus on the role of devices in economic life has been influential, not least in highlighting the 
importance of these often-overlooked influences on market outcomes (MacKenzie, 2006 and 
2011) and in drawing on examples dealing with a physical commodity (Çalışkan, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the work has been the object of multiple critiques, for example for its ‘neglect 
of power and politics’ (Ertürk, et al., 2013: 338; Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 2007). The critique 
that is most relevant here, however, is that the literature on market devices tends to ‘miss that 
which is precisely capitalist about capitalism: namely that the aim of any private enterprise is 
to generate profit, not construct a market’ (Ertürk, et al., 2013: 339). Paradoxically, the 
burgeoning literature on the role of devices in economic life contains surprisingly little 
discussion of the economics of those devices, of how much they cost, relative to the revenue 
available for their acquisition and use. That issue that is our focus here.  
 
Analytical Complexity and Computational Limitations 
In the literature on the role of complexity in finance, the notion of ‘complexity’ is sometimes 
used in the everyday sense; more rarely, the formal meaning of ‘computational complexity’ 
(touched on below) is deployed, as for example by Mirowski (2010). In both meanings of the 
term, it is clear that in the run-up to the credit crisis, the process of financial innovation – well 
characterized by Engelen and his colleagues as involving not a ‘rationalist grand plan’ but 
bricolage, ‘the creative and resourceful use of materials at hand… to fashion new structures 
out of conjunctural events’ (Engelen, et al., 2011: 51) – led to a sharp increase in the 
complexity of financial instruments, and that this complexity (and the resultant opacity of 
those instruments and of the economic circuits in which they were implicated) was an 
important driver of the crisis.  
 
Issues of analytical complexity are clearly not confined to the social sciences; they are also, 
unsurprisingly, a central focus of computer science. One example is the ‘Travelling Salesman 
problem’, concerning the absolute and increasing computational difficulty of calculating the 
optimum journey between points. A recent solution involving 85,900 points justified a 
Princeton University Press monograph and required the equivalent of years of computing 
time. This is an ‘NP-complete’ (Nondeterministic Polynomial) problem: the difficulty of 
calculating a solution increases exponentially with additional points (Maymin, 2011). For the 
purposes here, a solution may be even more impractical if it must be found quickly with 
limited resources. With CDOs, the resources available to pay for analysis are the return on 
the securities in question, and they are intrinsically constrained by the initial pool of assets 
involved. The core of the self-undermining nature of the financial innovation involved in 
CDOs results from this constraint of limited resources for analysis. Increasing complexity is 
required to produce ever-greater volumes of highly-rated securities from an underlying pool 
of assets whose returns cannot increase. (The assets underpinning a MBS or CDOs are debt 
instruments – mortgages, loans, etc. – and the returns from these are fixed by the underlying 
contracts.i) Fixed returns result in complexity outstripping calculative capacity. Financial 
innovators faced a ‘Lemon-Squeezing Problem’ which undermined financial stability. 
 
The article therefore seeks to bring questions of computational complexity into discussions of 
financial markets and their regulation. At its most ambitious, the literature on computational 
complexity points out the incompatibility of computational and market efficiency (Maymin, 
2011), and looks to challenge neoclassical macroeconomics (Mirowski, 2010). We join 
Hasanhodzic, et al. (2009) and Arora, et al. (2009) in seeing the issue of computational 
complexity as an extreme example of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). For Simon, our 
ability to act rationally is not limited by the availability of information, but rather by our 
ability to process that information because of limited computational capacity. In our analysis, 
the constraint on rationality is available resources relative to the time and computational 
capacity required to value securities. 
 
Arora, et al. (2009) see the issue in terms of informational asymmetries and Akerlof’s lemons 
problem: ‘designers of financial products can rely on computational intractability to disguise 
their information via suitable “cherry picking”.’ Such problems of information asymmetry 
certainly exist within the story of CDOs. Goldman Sachs’ infamous Abacus transactions are a 
well-known example, and legal actions against Goldman seek to demonstrate the firm’s 
information advantage (see, e.g., Lewis Baach, 2011). We focus, however, on the 
‘intractability’ or ‘infeasibility’ of calculation, within the available returns on the securities 
involved. Computational intractability, within available resources, is a problem for a market 
actor with all relevant information (see Hasanhodzic, et al., 2009, although their focus is not 
CDOs or derivatives), rather than with almost all relevant information (Arora, et al., 2009). 
This is not a lemons problem, but a lemon-squeezing problem. Two striking features of the 
CDO market support a focus away from information asymmetries. First, banks that structured 
the securities and owned mortgage-originating companies made substantial losses on holding 
the AAA-rated tranches of CDO issues they themselves structured. Any superior information 
these banks possessed did not protect them. Second, the necessary information to value these 
securities was available, using information systems such as Intex. The problem was only 
partly that few used this system, remarkable as that is. The overriding problem, our 
interviews revealed, was that using this system required uneconomic – in the sense of costing 
more than the returns available from owning the CDOs – amounts of skilled inputs and 
impractical levels of computer capacity to complete analysis within the resources and time 
available. 
 
The returns on CDOs, and the increasingly limited time available for considering a purchase, 
means, we argue, that they must be ‘information-insensitive’ securities, requiring limited 
analysis (see, e.g., Gorton, 2010). The purchase of CDOs was part of the increased global 
demand for such debt securities in the years preceding the crisis. This fits with analysis that 
sees the crisis as more an issue of demand than supply. Global demand for low risk US$ 
securities in excess of available US Treasuries and Agency debt drove securitization 
(Bernanke, et al., 2011; Caballero, 2009). Such analyses draw us into the issue that dominates 
much discussion of the financial crisis, the question of who, if anyone, should be blamed. 
This article is not interested in exonerating anyone, least of all the bankers and credit rating 
agencies involved in CDOs. Issues of complexity and the limits of knowledge as contributors 
to the crisis, and the implications for apportioning blame, are considered elsewhere (e.g., 
Bryan, et al., 2012; Engelen, et al., 2012). This article suggests fault lies with actors and 
structure, but (mainly) with actors who should have recognized the need for far greater 
analysis, and that the financial innovation involved in CDOs did not, and could not, allow 
returns that were sufficient for this analysis. 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligations: A Brief Introduction 
 
A bank arranging a CDO sets up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a company whose sole 
purpose is to buy assets (collateral) that comprise other debt securities (Bomfin, 2005). The 
assets considered here are Residential MBSs, which themselves buy and securitize residential 
mortgages. In return for a higher return, investors in the least senior tranches accept the first 
losses from non-payment on the underlying assets. The most senior (including ‘super-senior’) 
tranches offer very low returns, a AAA rating and (supposedly) minimal risk of loss. Figure 1 
sets out the structuring of a CDO which buys MBSs. 
 
  
Figure 1: Packaging tranches of MBS into ‘mezzanine’ CDOs 
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Source: modified from Lucas (2007) 
 
In the CDO market the less creditworthy tranches are further securitized into predominantly 
highly-rated, but a smaller volume of lowly-rated, tranches. The process was then repeated 
with these lowly-rated tranches. This is the lemon-squeezing whose inherent problems we 
explore. The highly-rated securities sold to investors offer higher returns at each stage of this 
chain of transactions, but the returns remain low (and had to remain low, since they were 
limited by the cash flow from the ultimate underlying assets) relative to the increasing 
complexity, and therefore analytical difficulties, of the securities.  
 
Analysing CDOs: the Intex system 
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In this section, we discuss the single most important market device employed by participants 
for analyzing CDOs, a software system called Intex. When we began this research we were 
unaware of Intex (it had not, and has not attracted academic attention) until an interviewee 
told us about it in January 2009. ‘I defy anyone to … deal with [the complexity of MBSs and 
CDOs] without extensive computer power and big embedded software’, he said. ‘And Intex 
provided that. Without it, this market could simply not exist.’ 
 
Unlike the systems employed by ratings agencies such as the Gaussian copula model (see 
MacKenzie, 2011), Intex is simply a cash-flow model. Once the structural characteristics of 
the MBS or CDO are crystalized in the form of an Intex file (a task normally undertaken by 
the banks seeking to sell the tranches of the MBS or CDO), a prospective purchaser can 
choose a variety of scenarios, and use Intex to investigate the future returns for the tranches 
of the MBS or CDO. An MBS purchaser, for example, could choose a mortgage default rate 
and some other assumptions, and the Intex system will work out from these the resultant cash 
flows and whether or not a given tranche will default  (i.e., fail to repay contracted amounts 
of interest and principal to investors).  
 
Although other similar systems were available, Intex seems to have been most widely used 
for tasks such as this. Even a simple vanilla MBS is a complex instrument (in the ordinary 
sense of the term ‘complex’), hard to get one’s head around: the offering circular is an 
incomplete account of the instrument, and one that cannot easily be processed for the 
purposes of economic analysis; the full legal documentation of a MBS or CDO runs to 
hundreds of daunting, unreadable pages. An Intex file, in contrast, captures the structure of a 
MBS or CDO in a way that is easily transferrable from the computer system of the bank 
constructing the CDO to the prospective purchaser’s. The purchaser can then try out the 
consequences of a variety of scenarios, decide whether or not to buy, or perhaps whether to 
request the constructor to change the instrument’s structure so that it was more attractive.  
 
Other ways of evaluating MBSs and CDOs are also briefly touched on in section eight, where 
we consider how market participants dealt with computational limitations, but Intex is central 
to our argument. We ask what was involved in performing an Intex analysis on different 
instruments in the MBS and CDO markets and how long it might take. We also ask whether it 
could be paid for from the returns offered by the instruments. We do not claim to provide 
quantitatively exact answers to those questions – that would require data that we do not have, 
and may never have been collected by market participants – but the differences demonstrated 
between the economic and computational characteristics of the evaluation of the instruments 
we discuss are so large that the qualitative conclusions drawn are robust, and the implications 
significant.  
 
Low returns on highly rated CDO tranches 
 
In this section, we consider the surprisingly low returns available to the purchasers of CDOs, 
a crucial component of our argument that these returns were inevitably too low to pay for the 
analysis needed. 
 
Low Returns for Risk Taking 
Popular discussion of, and political discourse regarding, the financial crisis have made much 
of financial market actors’ greed (FCIC, 2011; Madrick, 2011; Mason, 2009). It is therefore 
noteworthy how low profit margins actually were for those financial institutions bearing the 
ultimate risk: the Dublin unit responsible for the collapse of Landesbank Sachsen, which 
made investments in CDOs, made a total profit in 2005 of €44.2 million on investment of 
€8.3 billion (Kirchfeld and Simmons, 2008), or 0.53 percent. Deutsche Bank, in its 2007 
annual report, noted earnings of just €6 million on commitments supporting similar 
investments of €6.3 billion, Bank of New York Mellon US$3 million on commitments of 
US$3.2 billion, both returns of 0.10 percent (Acharya, et al., 2011: 29; see also Arteta, et al., 
2008). Market participants therefore faced not only the computational difficulties of 
analysing these securities: it was also that the returns they offered were too low to pay for 
such a full analysis.  
 
Low Fees for Collateral Managers     
Low returns for what should be complex analysis also occur elsewhere in the chain of 
transactions involved in a CDO. Part of the complexity is that these financial structures 
generally use a collateral manager. These managers are not buying securities on their own 
behalf, but choose the underlying assets on behalf of the final investors (Engelen, et al., 2011; 
Lewis, 2010). Investors quite reasonably feel collateral managers should protect their 
interests, but management fees were not high for what should have been a complex role. In 
one manager’s case, annual fees were said to be 0.09 – 0.17 percent of the transaction 
volume, with around 0.25 percent of additional performance fee (Shenn, 2010). Another 
estimate is that fees were 0.45 - 0.75 percent (Salas and Hassler, 2007). In equity fund 
management, these are fees closer to those charged by passive managers (investors that track 
the index rather than choosing individual stocks), not active managers, and fees appear to 
have declined over time (Chau, 2010). The total fees paid to CDO managers are large, at least 
US$1.5 billion for 2003-07 (FCIC, 2011: 131). However, that amount represents only 0.11 – 
0.23 percent of the total volume of CDOs (depending on the estimates of total volume used). 
CDO management was popular not because fees were high, but because managers had to do 
little analysis to earn them: ‘The CDO manager, in practice, didn’t do much of 
anything…”two guys and a Bloomberg terminal in New Jersey” was Wall Street shorthand 
for the typical CDO manager’ (Lewis, 2010: 141). Returns were maximized not by increased 
analysis of particular securities, but by not doing ‘much of anything’ on the largest volume of 
securities possible. Across the CDO industry, similar incentives resulted in huge volumes of 
insufficiently-analyzed securities. 
 
The need for timely analysis 
 
Low returns had to pay for analysis that was not only highly complex, but also needed to be 
completed very quickly by nearly all market participants. In this section, we consider the 
need for timely analysis for a range of actors in the CDO market, before discussing the 
significant time advantages available to those who shorted – sold securities they did not own 
in the hope of profiting from price falls – CDOs. 
 
Daily Valuation of Trading Books 
Banks increased their return on equity, the return made for shareholders, before the crisis in 
part through higher leverage assisted by the favourable capital treatment of bonds held on 
trading books, where banks accounted for the ownership of securities they were expected to 
buy or sell frequently. The Federal Reserve’s Norah Barger (2010) suggests that much of the 
buying of the most creditworthy and lowest yielding CDO tranches (our focus in this article) 
only occurred because of lower capital requirements on trading books.ii Trading book assets 
must be revalued daily. The bonds on the trading books are also frequently bought with 
money borrowed, on a secured basis, overnight, in ‘repo’ markets widely seen as central to 
the financial crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2009), which also require daily (if not more 
frequent) valuation.iii This introduces time pressure into calculations (see also Spears, 2014).  
 
Primary Market Purchases by CDO Managers 
CDO managers also needed timely analysis. The competition amongst CDO managers to buy 
assets, combined with the incentives for the constructing banks to sell quickly, meant that the 
time available for analysis for the purchase of the ‘mezzanine’ (BBB rated) tranches on 
which the CDO market depended was extremely short. It also declined as the mania gathered 
pace, falling from a week to a day or even less. One CDO manager told us his firm was able 
to do the analysis using Intex ‘in an hour or two’. Almost regardless of the amount spent on 
computer capacity, this was not sufficient time for a comprehensive analysis. The bespoke 
nature and small size of mezzanine tranches (only 3 percent of the original MBS in the 
typical structure shown in Figure 1 above) meant that they were illiquid – difficult to buy and 
sell – in the secondary market, so CDO managers had little choice but to buy new issues. In 
an example of how the dynamics of a bubble can reduce the time available for analysis, all 
the tranches of a new MBS were often sold within less than four hours. 
 
The Time Advantage of Short Sellers 
The most common explanation for the success of short sellers – investors, such as hedge 
funds, that made trades in the expectation of prices falling – is that a lemons problem exists. 
However, the success of short sellers fits well within our lemon-squeezing explanation. First, 
in contrast to the ‘long only’ buyer discussed elsewhere in this article, a hedge fund shorting 
an MBS or CDO is expecting substantial price falls and therefore substantial profit. The 
financial incentive to pay for analysis is therefore far higher. Second, the short seller does not 
face the time pressure of the MBS or CDO purchaser. The market opportunity is very 
unlikely to disappear within hours. Whatever the rights and wrongs of Goldman’s Abacus 
transactions, Paulson & Co. clearly had the time they needed to select the assets they wished 
to short. Even so, it is noteworthy that the short sellers highlighted (e.g., by Lewis, 2010) 
generally shorted MBSs, not CDOs, despite the fact that they would have made even greater 
profits from shorting CDOs. This may suggest that short sellers also faced difficulties in 
analyzing CDOs. 
 
The increasing complexity of CDOs 
 
In the article so far we have outlined the broad constraints faced by CDO market participants 
in the analysis of the bonds they purchased.  We have focused on two key issues: the 
economics of market devices and the complexity of financial instruments. In this section, we 
develop this argument by analyzing in detail the increasing complexity of the financial 
instruments which were structured in the CDO market as innovation developed. We 
investigate just what was involved in evaluating three classes of instrument of increasing 
complexity: 1) a ‘vanilla’ MBS; 2) a CDO of MBSs, in which tranches of MBSs (most 
commonly BBB rated) form the ‘pool’ of assets underpinning the CDO (see Figure 1 above); 
and 3) a CDO-squared, in which tranches of other CDOs, again most often BBB rated, form 
the asset pool. As this market became even more overheated, ‘CDO-cubed’ issues were also 
structured, repackaging tranches of CDO-squared, but we do not have access to an offering 
circular for such an issue. 
 
Our presentation of a relatively straightforward linear process of financial innovation is of 
course highly simplified. Financial market actors, seeking to squeeze the lemon to create 
more saleable securities from the capped returns from the underlying mortgages, were 
engaged in a far more complicated process than we outline here. The argument we make 
regarding the analytical intractability of these bonds, however, is only strengthened by any 
additional complexity.  
 
In the next section, we first discuss a simple approach to demonstrating how increased 
complexity outpaced the resources (the returns from owning the securities) available for 
analysis. We then discuss interviewees’ experiences in using Intex to value these securities, 
before presenting further evidence of analytical difficulties. 
 
Increasing Complexity Outpaces Increasing Returns 
Our simplistic approach to the problem of increasing complexity outpacing increasing returns 
at successive stages of CDO innovation compares the returns available on the highest 
yielding AAA trancheiv of the three classes of instrument, compared to the number of 
underlying mortgages which would need to be analyzed for each instrument. We use 
information from the offering circulars of three such instruments, which show the relevant 
returns and either give the actual number of underlying mortgages or allow a sensible 
estimate.v To calculate the return, we assume the investors investing money borrowed from 
depositors or wholesale markets.vi The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) represents a 
reasonable proxy for the cost of that borrowing. An investor therefore borrows funds at a cost 
of LIBOR, and uses those funds to invest in a security that gives a return of LIBOR plus a 
margin. The borrowing cost of LIBOR is matched by the LIBOR earned on the investment. 
This leaves a fixed margin, or return, regardless of changes in LIBOR. In the case of the 
MBS analyzed, this is 0.24 percent. We assumed an investment of US$100 million, giving a 
fixed return is US$240,000 on the MBS. The MBS had bought 4507 mortgages, giving a 
return of US$53.25 for each mortgage in the pool of underlying collateral.vii For the CDO and 
CDO squared, the same methodology was used, as summarized in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Returns and Number of Underlying Mortgages, Various Securitization 
Structures 
 
 MBSviii CDOix CDO Squaredx 
Margin on Highest Yielding AAA Tranche 0.24% 0.40% 1.30% 
Return on $100m Investment US$240,000 US$400,000 US$1,300,000 
Number of Underlying Mortgages 4507 352,000xi 19,600,000xii 
Return per Underlying Mortgage $53.25 $1.14 $0.07 
 
 
As noted above, ‘CDO-cubed’ were also arranged. If the CDO-cubed had as its collateral 50 
CDO-squared securities, the number of underlying mortgages rises to 98,000,000. 
As Table 1 shows, the returns to investors from investing in the highest yielding AAA 
tranche of each instrument increased considerably with each stage of innovation. However, 
the number of underlying mortgages which needed to be understood for a full analysis 
increased far more substantially. As a result, the return per underlying mortgage – our proxy 
of the resources available for analysis – falls, from $53.25 for the MBS to just 7 cents for the 
CDO-squared. 
 
Central to the lemon-squeezing problem is the fact that the pool of mortgages initially created 
produces a fixed return. The investor has an amount of money to invest, in return for which it 
receives a portion of the cash flow from the mortgages. The bank constructing the deal can 
make changes to the structure, but the returns from the mortgages cannot materially change. 
Adding more mortgages to the pool would not increase the return to an investor investing a 
fixed amount. The solution is the innovation of CDOs and CDO-squared, which increase 
returns, but at the cost of exponentially increasing complexity. 
 
The article contends that the analysis of MBSs was feasible within the context of the 
resources available (the return on the bonds), and could continue on an ongoing basis with the 
frequency required to hold these bonds on a bank trading book. This feasibility can only be a 
contention (and clearly many initial purchasers likely regret their analysis, given subsequent 
events), but is based on a number of points. First, the MBS market was dominated by the 
largest investors who could meet the cost of analysis (including the purchase of Intex ).  
Furthermore, absolutely precise valuation is not the issue, given the enormous losses 
subsequently made. Large financial institutions could still aggregate information across the 
various deals they held. To create sufficiently accurate outputs from Intex, it was not 
necessary to understand the detailed development of every mortgage, but to have a clearer 
picture of what was occurring with sub-prime mortgage lending in, say, California or Florida. 
This clearer picture could come with some analysis of the individual mortgages when the 
mortgages are of the number in an MBS, but not with the subsequent innovation of CDOs. 
 
Increasing Difficulties of Intex Analysis of the Three Instruments 
In this section, we use interview data to consider the difficulties of Intex analysis of the three 
instruments, starting with MBSs.  One interviewee demonstrated a single Intex ‘run’ for a 
specific tranche of such a MBS. Inputting the necessary data (he used simply fixed values of 
the inputs, not – as he normally would – inputs that varied through time) took around 20 
seconds, and the Intex system then took around 30 seconds to calculate the future cash flows 
to an investor in the tranche. He was using the version of Intex available to internet 
subscribers, but he told the authors that the system’s response time would be faster – fewer 
than ten seconds – using the version running on his bank’s own servers. On the other hand, he 
would normally have to input full monthly curves of interest rates and default rates for the 
lifetime of the security. Nevertheless, he said that a single run could be completed in 
‘minutes’.  
 
A single run would not count as adequate analysis of the MBS. This would require multiple 
runs, interviewees told us. A full Monte Carlo simulationxiii to get a ‘rough price’ would need 
100,000 runs and ‘a million simulations or more to get some decent risk measures’. The 
inputs for this simulation could of course be entirely automated, but with each run taking a 
few seconds of computation time, the simulation was a time consuming task. It could be 
speeded up, for example by distributing the task over multiple computers, and certainly was 
not entirely impossible. It involves assumptions about future events (for example, 
prepayments – early redemptions by the borrowers – of fixed rate mortgages are closely 
linked to US government bond yields), but so must all investment. Consideration of the 4507 
underlying residential mortgages in the MBS analyzed above is essential to ensure the 
aggregated assumptions about this mortgage pool entered into Intex produce valid outputs. 
The need for accurate assumptions will add time to any analysis. Nor is Intex cheap; the bank 
at which our interviewee demonstrated Intex was paying US$1.5 million p.a. to use it. This 
cost is presumably a major factor in the low use of Intex amongst (particularly European) 
investors. However, as our simplistic analysis above suggests, and what interviewees told us 
confirmed, Intex analysis of a ‘vanilla’ MBS was possible within the required resource and 
time constraints. 
 
   
The same claim could not be made regarding the analysis of CDOs, which widely used Intex. 
That task was vastly more time consuming than analyzing a single MBS. First, appropriate 
inputs for the default rate, etc., must be chosen for each MBS: given the differences among 
them, choosing the same default rate for all of them was clearly inadequate, but judging the 
appropriate rates was a skilled, time-consuming human task. Then Intex had to be configured 
first to run a cash flow analysis for each underlying MBS, and second to feed the inputs from 
these analyses into the Intex model of the CDO. While, as noted above, a single run of Intex 
for a specific MBS tranche would take ‘minutes’, an interviewee told the authors that a single 
run of a CDO, ‘doing loan-level modeling for the underlying [MBS] bonds then applying it to 
[the] CDO… would have taken hours. So you might set [it] running on the evening then 
come back the next morning to look at the results [for a] single scenario’.  
 
Given that, it is not surprising that interviews suggest that the analysis of CDOs using Intex 
typically took the form of only a handful of runs: a base case, incorporating the analysts’ 
most likely scenario, and a small number (perhaps as few as three, an interviewee reported) 
of ‘stressed’ scenarios to get some sense of the consequences of adverse outcomes. No 
interviewee reported attempting anything approaching a full Monte Carlo simulation: with a 
single run taking several hours, a million runs was clearly infeasible, even if one were able to 
distribute the computational task over multiple machines. (In 2006-7, an investment-bank 
computer room might have upwards of a thousand machines in it, but ‘parallelizing’ a 
programme is never fully efficient: running it on a thousand machines is not a thousand times 
as fast as running it on one, e.g. because the machines must communicate with each other.) 
The computation simply could not be completed in time.  
 
These difficulties were very significantly compounded with CDO-squareds, which rendered 
even a single Intex run hugely time consuming. One interviewee told us that in consequence 
he simply avoided such CDOs: ‘I never did a … CDO with other CDOs in an underlying pool 
– never would have done – because I believe them…computationally intractable’. In addition, 
sharp-eyed readers will notice that the 98 million mortgages in a CDO-cubed are more than 
the total number of mortgages outstanding in the United States. Even 19.6 million, as in the 
CDO-squared analyzed above, is approaching half the total. The lemon-squeezers faced 
another constraint: there were not enough mortgages outstanding to achieve the 
diversification on which the ratings should have depended. Two solutions were employed, 
both increasing analytical complexity. Different asset types were included in the collateral 
pool, such as commercial MBSs in the CDO analyzed here. This represents at least partial 
diversification, but increases the range of expertise needed for the assumptions underpinning 
the Intex calculations. The other solution, increasingly common is 2006-7, is highly 
questionable in terms of diversification, and involved very significantly increased analytical 
complexity. The term an interviewee used for this solution was ‘circles’, whereby CDOs 
invest in each other’s asset pools. Circles often resulted from a ‘scratch my back and I’ll 
scratch yours’ agreement between two CDO managers. CDO A would include a tranche of 
CDO B in its asset pool, and vice versa. The resultant computational ‘loop’ made evaluation 
‘completely intractable’ said another interviewee: even a single Intex run was now effectively 
impossible.  
 
Problems of a Changing Collateral Pool 
Our discussion thus far understates the challenges in valuing CDOs, because it assumes a 
fixed pool of assets. Many CDOs, including those analyzed here, employ a collateral manager 
(see above), which MBSs do not. The collateral manager – within constraints set out in the 
issue documentation, and, it has been claimed, subject to pressure from banks arranging 
CDOs (see, e.g., Shenn, 2010) – sells and buys assets in the collateral pool. Investors do not 
therefore face a constant collateral pool to analyze. A similar problem is that many deals have 
a ‘ramp-up period’. This involves a period – up to six months (Shivdasani and Wang, 2009: 
9) – after the investors have bought the CDO tranches when further assets are purchased 
(again within preset constraints) to increase the size of the collateral pool. Cash flows into the 
CDO from amortization, maturities, prepayment or sales are also reinvested by the manager. 
Although the investors know the broad characteristics of these assets, they do not know the 
specific assets. This is particularly important when, as in subprime mortgages, the quality of 
the underlying assets deteriorated over time.  CDO investors in 2005, for example, when 
subprime mortgages were of generally higher quality, found that their CDO bought 
mortgages from 2006 and 2007, when quality had significantly deteriorated (Goodman, et al., 
2008: 286).xiv  
 
Further Evidence of the Problems of Analytical Complexity 
We next discuss further anecdotal evidence which strongly supports the conclusion that 
computational complexity constrained analytical capacity. Barger (2010) recounts how 
Citigroup in late 2007 told regulators that they had not been including AAA CDOs in 
calculations to determine capital against their trading book. They were told to calculate the 
requirement as soon as possible. Citigroup had to analyze individual mortgages (the process 
discussed above), and took ‘several months’.xv In addition, investment banks’ valuation of the 
same financial product varied widely and valuation of different tranches within banks could 
be mutually inconsistent (Arora, et al., 2009). In part, this results from ‘clusters of [very 
different] evaluation practices’ (MacKenzie, 2011), but it also points to analytical difficulties. 
The long time that layered Intex models (i.e., analysis of CDOs that had purchased tranches 
of MBSs) take to complete their calculations discouraged (with hindsight essential) 
evaluation. Even with enormous computing capacity (see discussion of Goldman Sachs, 
which still employed a shortcut, below), it is not clear that the analysis could be fast enough 
for daily revaluation of all positions. The complaint by Basis Yield Alpha Fund against 
Goldman Sachs discusses a ‘CDO valuation project’, which used ‘three different valuation 
methods to price all of its remaining CDO warehouse assets and unsold securities’ (Lewis 
Baach, 2011: 30);xvi i.e., ex post valuation of assets. The physical constraints for any investor 
attempting even incomplete evaluation were not just physical space and cost, but even the air-
conditioning capacity to deal with the heat from hundreds of computers.   
   
Dealing with computational limitations 
 
Given the difficulties, outlined above, of analyzing a CDO from the ‘bottom up’ – i.e. by 
doing multiple Intex runs with different assumptions about the behaviour of the underlying 
mortgage pools – it is unsurprising that market participants sought analytical ‘shortcuts’. In 
this section, we explore the most common shortcuts and how these approaches failed to 
provide satisfactory valuations. 
 
Top-Down Analysis 
By far the most common analytical shortcut was ‘the bond method’, or top-down analysis, 
involving no analysis of the underlying mortgage pools. Instead, the behavior of an MBS (or 
CDO in a CDO-squared structure) tranche was simply inferred from its credit rating, and the 
CDO was analyzed as if it were simply a CDO made up of corporate bonds. That is how the 
rating agencies and many market participants analyzed CDOs (MacKenzie, 2011). However, 
although default probabilities inferred from ratings had some credibility, the bond method 
also required inputting figures for the correlations among MBS tranches: ‘There was never a 
good source of correlation numbers’, reported an interviewee. As he told the authors, there 
was a widespread understanding amongst market participants that the correlation figures (of 
the order of 0.3) used by the rating agencies were far too low, but what was much less clear 
was how high a figure to use: 0.5, 0.7, maybe even 0.8. Even now, the correct correlation 
remains unclear. Indeed, most specialists would now agree that the bond method rested on a 
mistaken analogy between MBS tranches and companies: it involved, as an interviewee put 
it, ‘mistaking tranches for companies’.    
 
Goldman Sachs developed perhaps the most intriguing shortcut. They employed, so an 
interviewee said, a hybrid of the ‘bond method’ (top-down) and bottom-up analysis. It was 
computationally very demanding – requiring a ‘computer farm’ in New Jersey, the authors 
were told – but tractable. Goldman, however, was as far as we can tell the only market 
participant to do things this way. Others either satisfied themselves with a relatively small 
number of Intex runs, or fell back on the bond method.  
 
Outsourcing Analysis 
A common alternative shortcut was simply to outsource the credit analysis. A number of 
legal actions argue that CDO arrangers and/or managers had responsibility for the securities 
they sold, effectively challenging caveat emptor, or ‘buyer beware’ (e,g, Lewis Baarth, 
2011). The main outsourcing, however, was to the rating agencies, particularly for AAA-
rated tranches, and criticism of their role is widespread. However, the key point to note here 
is that rating agencies face the same constraints as investors. The rating agencies cannot be 
exonerated for their role in the CDO market (and the reported failure of Moody’s and 
possibly of other agencies even to subscribe to Intex is particularly noteworthy), but the 
extreme analytical challenge and time pressure of such volumes of initial ratings and ongoing 
monitoring was far beyond the challenge facing any individual bank or CDO manager. At the 
2006 peak, Moody’s was rating on average more than two new CDOs every business day 
(FCIC, 2011: 149).  
 
None of the rating agencies did bottom-up analyses of CDOs: they all used variants of the 
bond method (fatally, with modest estimates of correlation). The closest to a bottom-up 
rating-agency analysis we found was a relatively small-scale experiment broadly similar to 
the hybrid method employed by Goldman Sachs (although as far as we can tell it was done 
entirely independently, with no interaction between the two teams). Correlations of around 
0.8 were found, far above the 0.3 used in the bond method of CDO rating. It remained, 
however, just an experiment, with no influence on practice at the agency; the group 
conducting it did not have organizational responsibility for CDOs. It was ‘a case of 
intellectual curiosity’, one of the experimenters told us; CDO rating ‘wasn’t “under our 
watch” at the time’. The agencies did do significant analysis: Moody’s, for example, included 
a matrix with 1000 scenarios (Adelson, 2010), and Standard and Poor’s Monte Carlo based 
modeling tool does 500,000 iterations (Alblescu, 2010). However, these 500,000 iterations, 
which could be performed on a standard computer in less than a minute, did not ‘drill down’ 
to the underlying mortgages. Investors could not avoid the lemon-squeezing problem by 
outsourcing analysis to the rating agencies, as the agencies were not – and could not be – paid 
amounts sufficient for the analysis necessary. 
 
Successful Outsourcing Before CDOs 
In the market for MBSs before the emergence of CDOs, investors buying highly-rated 
tranches effectively outsourced analysis to investors in the mezzanine tranches of the 
structure (see Adelson and Jacob, 2008). These specialist investors received relatively high 
returns for potentially significant risk. They therefore had the resources and incentive to 
complete meaningful credit analysis on the underlying mortgage portfolios. The unique 
position of these investors in the market also meant that they were given the necessary time to 
complete their analysis, which included examining the electronic records of the underlying 
mortgages. Essentially, investors in the more senior, low return tranches were dependent on 
the quality of this analysis. CDOs undermined this role, because CDOs purchased the 
mezzanine tranches at tighter spreads and with less time for analysis than traditional 
mezzanine investors were prepared to accept. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Space precludes a detailed discussion of how successful specific regulatory responses to the 
crisis have been in addressing the Lemon-Squeezing Problem. It is clear that increased capital 
requirements for trading books, especially for the securities we discuss here, leverage limits 
and greater scepticism about bank risk models are all potentially steps in the right direction. 
Complexity, in its more general sense, is both a recognised contributor to the crisis and an 
influence on regulatory responses, but these responses have addressed the issues discussed 
here largely accidently: the specific issue of the limits of computational capacity within finite 
resources has not been recognised. The result is that some responses – e.g., increasing 
competition in the credit rating industry – could arguably even make matters worse. The 
securitization industry is based on the use of increased complexity to squeeze ever greater 
returns from a finite income stream. That process must (and in only three steps did) reach the 
limits of computational capacity. Without regulatory constraint, this type of financial 
innovation will outpace increases in (affordable) computer power.        
  
An important further question is obviously whether this inevitability is specific to CDOs, 
securitization generally, or is inherent in the bricolage (Engelen, et al., 2011: 51) that 
characterises financial market innovation more broadly. It is necessary to remain cautious 
regarding that conclusion, but it is nevertheless important to consider, first, the inherent 
problem with securitization, and, second, the extent to which attempts by financial market 
actors to deal with this inherent problem can be seen as applying in other forms of financial 
innovation. The inherent problem with securitization is the inevitable conflict between fixed 
returns – the interest on the assets in any underlying portfolio – and complexity – the 
computational difficulties that arise in the tranching of securities that is the central innovation 
of the securitization process.  
 
There are two basic ways to deal with these limits on computational capacity. The first is to 
‘outsource’ full analysis to others, be they the arrangers of the CDOs or the credit rating 
agencies. This can only be effective if the arrangers or agencies are being paid fees sufficient 
for them to complete the necessary analysis. In a market constrained by the lemon-squeezing 
problem, this cannot happen. The second is to use assumptions, as inputs to computer models, 
to simplify the analytical process, rather than undertaking sufficient analysis for the 
assumptions to be valid, and/or considering numbers of scenarios to cover a sufficient range 
of assumptions. One question regarding the more general applicability of the problems in the 
innovation of CDOs is therefore the extent to which these two approaches might be taken in 
other areas of financial innovation. There are certainly reasons to suggest that they might. 
Heavy reliance on the rating agencies, not least thanks to regulation, pervades financial 
markets, and much of the market for Exchange Traded Funds involves investors relying on 
arrangers of highly complex structures. Assumptions, particularly regarding the applicability 
of past to future performance, are also central to financial markets, for example in the options 
market. Such assumptions were shown to be problematic with equity options in the 1987 
stock market crash, but this did not prevent the assumption of no nationwide fall in US house 
prices causing financial disaster 20 years later.  
 
The lemon-squeezing problem we highlight involves, at its heart, the increased complexity of 
trying to get ever more from a finite resource. Broad parallels can certainly be seen elsewhere 
in financial innovation, for example in developments in bank balance sheets in the years 
preceding the financial crisis. Banks increased their Return on Equity (the lemon juice) as 
their Return on Assets (the lemon) remained constant or even declined (Haldane, 2009). This 
was achieved by financial innovation (aided by regulatory forbearance) which both watered 
down what counted as bank capital and restructured assets (for example, turning mortgages 
into MBSs or BBB CDO tranches into AAA) in ways that reduced risk-weighted assets and 
allowed higher leverage. The result was greater complexity: ‘Banks appeared to have 
discovered a money machine, albeit one whose workings were sometimes impossible to 
understand’ (Haldane, 2009: 2). Equity investors temporarily received higher returns, but at 
the cost of banks they could not analyze. We argue in this article that financial innovation, in 
the specific case of CDOs, contains the seeds of its own destruction, because of the lemon-
squeezing problem. Increasing complexity necessarily outpaces the resources to pay for the 
necessary analysis of this complexity. The extent to which this is inherent in financial 
innovation more widely is a question of considerable importance. The issues raised by 
computational complexity are therefore worthy of further study.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 Payments to MBS or CDO investors are almost always fixed relative to LIBOR, and those investors in turn 
borrow at a cost also fixed relative to LIBOR. Therefore, interest rate rises increase the cashflow through the 
MBS or CDO, but generate no extra income for investors. 
ii
 A further indication of their low returns. 
iii
 A transaction undertaken for only one day also obviously reduces the return substantially. Lending US$100 
million at, say, 3 per cent per annum overnight earns interest of slightly over $8000.  
iv
 This is the most conservative possible approach. The overall conclusions apply even more strongly to the 
more senior, even lower yielding tranches. In the MBS analyzed, for example, three more senior tranches 
offered LIBOR plus 0.04, 0.14 and 0.16 percent respectively.  
v
 See http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/. 
 
vi
 Banks were the main investors in the higher rated MBSs and CDOs. Hedge funds are similarly likely to be 
investing borrowed money. For investors in CMLT, see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/. 
vii
 $240,000 divided by 4507. 
 
viii
 Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC2 (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/). 
ix
 Kleros Real Estate Finance I (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/). 
x
 Timberwolf I (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/). 93 per cent of the collateral assets are Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS), so this is largely a ‘synthetic CDO’. Synthetic CDO sell CDS (i.e., are paid to take the risk of default on 
the reference securities underlying the CDS) rather than buying MBSs or CDOs. Issuance volumes are therefore 
constrained only by the willingness of financial institutions to ‘short’ the reference MBS or CDOs, either for 
hedging or speculation. Returns and risks on synthetic CDOs, however, are ultimately remain tied to the returns 
on the reference MBS or CDOs, which are securities of the kind discussed here, so the lemon-squeezing 
problem remains (for discussion of synthetic CDOs, see FCIC, 2010, 142-6). 
                                                                                                                                                        
xi
 Authors’calculation based on maximum number if underlying securities under the single issuer concentration 
(prospectus, p.124), 88, multiplied by 4000, an estimation of the number of underlying mortgages in the chosen 
MBS. The lower number than 4507 is conservative, because the collateral includes ‘a substantial number’ (but a 
minority) of Commercial MBS, which have fewer underlying mortgages.  
xii
 56 (number of underlying CDOs given in prospectus) multiplied by 350,000. 
xiii
 Monte Carlo simulation involves defining the range of possible values of each parameter (in this case, 
mortgage default rate, recovery rate, recovery time, prepayment rate and interest rates); creating a ‘scenario’ by 
using random numbers to choose a set of values within those ranges; calculating the result (in this case, cash 
flow) for that scenario; repeating the exercise many times (i.e., generating multiple scenarios); and aggregating 
the results across scenarios. 
xiv
 Particular features of CDOs’ ‘six-pack’ structure also increase the sensitivity of any valuation to the 
underlying assumptions used, further increasing complexity. 
xv
 Barger says that Bank of America was in a similar position. 
xvi
 The case would presumably be strengthened if Goldman were shown to know the true value of the assets 
throughout.  
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